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The Dangers of Political Party Strengthening Legislation 
in Solomon Islands 
 
The Solomon Islands government is considering introducing laws aimed at strengthening 
political parties, at restricting MPs from switching sides and at halting excessive use of 
‘no confidence’ motions. The government wants to (i) abolish the constitutional position 
of the ‘Leader of the Independents’2, (ii) reform the process of selection of Prime 
Ministers and (iii) build a more coherent party system by adopting legislation similar to 
that experimented with in Papua New Guinea3. The aim is to increase political stability, 
and give Prime Ministers and Cabinets an opportunity to implement their policies without 
having to focus continually on sustaining fragile coalitions, or on attracting opposition 
members to cross the floor to strengthen governments.  
 
Objectives of Party Integrity Legislation 
 
Several objectives can be served by such laws, sometimes referred to as political party 
integrity legislation. Sometimes, the aim is parliamentary stability, sometimes nation-
building , and sometimes the goal of strengthening parties is driven by the view that 
strong political parties are an inevitable feature of ‘proper’ democracy (although Ancient 
Greece, the ‘cradle of democracy’, never had political parties and nor for that matter do 
many local councils in the mass democracies of Western Europe or Australasia)4. 
Legislation against floor-crossing has been introduced in many parts of the Pacific, 
including Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. The Samoans have legal controls on 
what kinds of new parties can be formed (So’o & Fraenkel 2005: 355). Even in Tahiti 
(French Polynesia), frustration with continual government change led Gaston Flosse to 
alter the electoral law in 2004 hoping to stabilise the political order (although the result 
was a major defeat for his party). Often, the real objective behind party integrity 
legislation is to strengthen governments, despite the public rationale being to strengthen 
political parties.  
 
In several cases, laws against MPs crossing the floor have been introduced in the hope of 
consolidating one political faction, but have ended up strengthening another. That is what 
happened in Papua New Guinea and Fiji. In PNG, the government of Sir Mekere Morauta 
introduced laws binding MPs to political parties, but Sir Michael Somare won the 2002 
election and his government proved the beneficiary of the new laws. The opposition in 
PNG stayed away from parliament during much of the second half of 2004, frustrated at 
their inability to challenge the Somare government. In the wake of the 2007 election, 
leading figures on the opposition benches – including New Ireland Governor Sir Julius 
Chan – have denounced the OLIPPAC legislation as promoting dictatorship5.  
 
In Fiji, Sitiveni Rabuka’s government amended the constitution to prevent floor-crossing 
in 1997, but Mahendra Chaudhry won the 1999 election. The new law ensured that 
Chaudhry’s Fiji Labour Party’s 37 seats in the 71-member parliament was an unbreakable 
majority. The allied parties in the Labour-led People’s Coalition all split, with the rank-
and-file joining opposition protests against the government. Within Labour ranks, Fijian 
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members like Dr Tupeni Baba and Kenneth Zinck challenged the policies being pursued 
by the Labour leader. But these rebels could not legally switch sides. A year later, Fiji 
witnessed a coup d’etat.  
 
In other cases, laws binding MPs to political parties have not worked as intended. In 
India, more MPs crossed the floor after 1985 legislation aimed at preventing floor-
crossing than beforehand (Indian Advisory Panel on Electoral Reforms, 2001: 24-24). In 
New Zealand, laws against MPs switching sides simply delayed inevitable political 
realignments, and political opinion turned against their continued usage (Geddis 2002). 
Likewise in PNG, when Treasurer Bart Philemon fell out with his Prime Minister, Sir 
Michael Somare, the new laws prevented him from founding the inevitable new political 
party (the New Generation Party) until shortly before the 2007 polls. One 2003 survey of 
the usage of rules against party defections concluded that, leaving aside a few as yet 
untested exceptions, the legislation was ‘problematic at best and unworkable at worst’ 
(Miskin, 2002-3: iii). 
 
In PNG, the rules against floor-crossing contained in the Organic Law on the Integrity of 
Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) have not yet been fully tested before the 
courts. Eleven members broke ranks during Somare’s 2002-7 government, but none lost 
their seat. What will happen in PNG when a Prime Minister finds himself politically 
isolated and unpopular? What will happen if only the law prevents the fall of such a 
government? There are plenty of cases across the Pacific where Prime Ministers have 
shown themselves willing to exploit every available legal instrument to avoid the fall of 
their governments (consider, for example, then Solomon Islands Prime Minister Francis 
Billy Hilly’s attempt to rescue his government in 1994, or Sogavare’s efforts to stave off 
impending defeat in late 2007). If laws are in place that protect Prime Ministers against 
no confidence votes, will they be complied with when they are used in such a 
transparently self-serving manner? The former Chief Justice of PNG has suggested that, 
in such circumstances, OLIPPAC may not withstand a constitutional challenge. The 
courts may rule the law null and void because it restrains MPs freedom of association or 
conscience6. In Vanuatu, Serge Vohor passed laws in 2004 providing a 12-month ‘grace 
period’ during which there could not be a ‘no confidence’ motion, but this was ruled 
unconstitutional by the courts and the Vohor government was subsequently toppled7.  
 
Essentials of OLIPPAC 
 
How does OLIPPAC work in PNG? First, under OLIPPAC the party with the largest 
number of seats after an election gets the initial opportunity to form a government8. The 
law helped Sir Michael Somare to become Prime Minister in 2002 and again a second 
time after the July 2007 elections, for he was after both elections the leader of the largest 
party (the National Alliance). Second, there are some rather weak financial incentives to 
join parties (and added incentives for female candidates), and disincentives to remaining 
as independents, and there are rules regarding the registration of political parties. Third, 
and most importantly, MPs in PNG who vote for a particular Prime Minister cannot vote 
against that Prime Minister in any vote of confidence, budgetary vote and vote on 
constitutional amendments for the life of the parliament. There are loopholes. If a party 
decides collectively to switch sides - in accordance with its internal rules and procedures 
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- it can do so. For that reason, many Papua New Guinea politicians constituted 
themselves as one-man political parties, so as to retain their freedom to switch to and fro. 
Others nominally conformed with the law, if only to reduce the prospect of judicial 
intervention. Such responses to the OLIPPAC legislation indicate another problem with 
such provisions: these weaken the separation of powers, and require judges to adjudicate 
the internal rules of political parties9 or to uphold the rules of procedures of parliament. 
Historically, the courts have been reluctant to assume jurisdiction over the internal affairs 
of parliament, and have viewed the Speaker as the proper authority for the internal self-
regulation of parliament10.   
 
The other key part of PNG’s government strengthening package is ‘grace periods’ which 
were introduced separately as part of the 1975 constitution, and extended in 1991. After 
an election, a new government has 18 months during which there cannot be a ‘no 
confidence’ motion (a provision Sir Michael Somare in 2004 unsuccessfully attempted to 
extend to 36 months). And if there is a ‘no confidence’ motion in the last 12 months of 
the life of PNG’s five-year terms, parliament gets dissolved and there is an early election. 
Since MPs always want to prolong their periods in office, there never has been a 
successful ‘no confidence’ motion in the last year of a PNG parliament’s term. That 
shows one interesting way of maintaining the safety valve of ‘no confidence’ motions, 
while ensuring that these are not used in a frivolous manner or simply to grab hold of 
ministerial portfolios or for ‘fund-raising’11. If a no confidence vote entails a general 
dissolution of parliament and an early election, MPs might take this option only if they 
are riding the crest of a wave of popular dissatisfaction with government. Under normal 
circumstances, as the PNG history indicates, they will not want to rock the boat if that 
means going back to face the electorate earlier than normal. Elections are costly affairs. 
Between 50 and 75 percent of members in PNG tend to lose their seats at each general 
election.  
 
The consequences of laws that ensure that a no confidence vote entails a general 
dissolution of parliament are illustrated by the Kiribati semi-presidential system. In 
Kiribati, the Beretitenti (president) is directly elected, but he/she forms a cabinet 
composed of members of parliament. Parliament can remove the Beretitenti through a 
confidence vote. But if they do so at any point during the President’s term of office, all 
members of the Maneaba ni Maungatabu (parliament) lose their seats. A President facing 
a challenge to legislation he is pressing through parliament can also stamp this as raising 
a question of confidence, so that if he loses the consequent vote the result is, likewise, a 
dissolution of parliament and a fresh general election12. The institutional set-up contains a 
strong deterrent to usage of ‘no confidence’ motions, but this has not been altogether 
been abolished. On three occasions, 1982, 1993 and 2003, there have been premature 
dissolutions of parliament, and early elections. Nevertheless, there has been considerably 
greater political stability in Kiribati than in neighbouring Nauru or Tuvalu, where it is 
possible to dislodge a government without going back to the polls. Without the 
dissolution provisions in the I-Kiribati Constitution, there is little doubt that the country 
would have witnessed far more regular changes in government.  
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The Impact of OLIPPAC 
 
What has been the impact of OLIPPAC in PNG? First, the number of political parties has 
risen, not fallen13. It has followed a wave-like motion. After OLIPPAC, the number of 
registered parties rose to 43 in 2002, then fell back as a result of five amalgamations and 
de-registration of fourteen on-paper parties with no seats at all in 200614, and then rose 
again to 34 ahead of the 2007 polls. The number of parliamentary parties after the 2002 
elections was 22. This decreased largely due to amalgamations to around 15 in 2006, but 
then rose to 21 after the 2007 election (Sepoe, Gelu & May 2007). Second, no MP has as 
yet lost his or her seat due to this law, although there were many breaches of OLIPPAC. 
Cases were referred to the Ombudsman, but no action was taken15. The MPs concerned 
were all able to retain their seats, despite the legal position. In that respect, the law was a 
paper tiger. Yet if Sir Michael Somare’s government had been about to fall, the pressures 
to enforce the law would no doubt have been much greater. Third, Somare’s 2002-7 
government was the first since independence to survive a full term in office. In that sense, 
the law brought ‘stability’, an achievement much cherished by PNG reformers. But 
although the Prime Minister did not change through 2002-7, many of the key ministers 
changed regularly and there were frequent associated changes at the top levels of the 
public sector bureaucracy. No confidence challenges were avoided during Somare’s 
2002-7 government not only due to the 18-month grace period and OLIPPAC, but also by 
suspension of parliament at critical junctures when opposition forces were mustering for 
a challenge, by changes of ministers and by the drawing of opposition parties into the 
governing coalition (Sepoe, Gelu & May 2007: 7-8).  
 
There are always dangers associated with laws aimed at restricting ‘no confidence’ 
challenges or at binding MPs to political parties. They may stabilise popular 
governments, avoid frivolous ‘no confidence’ motions and permit parliament to 
concentrate on law-making, but they may also remove the ability to dislodge a corrupt 
administration or entrench an unpopular government. In Solomon Islands on April 18th 
2006, Snyder Rini was elected Prime Minister by parliament, behind closed doors, after 
an intense period of wheeling and dealing between rival factions based at three Chinese-
owned Honiara hotels. Consequent protests outside parliament culminated in the burning 
down of much of Honiara’s Chinatown district and involved attacks on Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands vehicles. Eight days later, Snyder Rini 
resigned to head off an impending ‘no confidence’ vote, leading to jubilation amongst 
crowds in Honiara. If the Papua New Guinea grace-period legislation had been in place in 
Solomon Islands on April 18th, the short-lived Rini-led government would have had 18 
months before it could face a ‘no confidence’ challenge, and OLIPPAC might have given 
that government a full four year term. Deprived of constitutional means of dislodging the 
government, social unrest might have continued to assume a violent and destructive 
form16. Locking in such a government would have been an unwise and dangerous policy 
choice.  
 
The subsequent government, led by Manasseh Sogavare, was keen on making provision 
to strengthen governments, and diminish the opportunity for no-confidence votes. In the 
period prior to the fall of the Snyder Rini-led government, Sogavare had proved able to 
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manoeuvre in such a way as to become the opposition’s candidate for the Prime 
Ministerial post (Fraenkel 2006a). In the months after he captured the top job, several 
frustrated leaders of the smaller parties in his Grand Coalition for Change broke away 
and joined the opposition17. Ironically, some, such as Bartholomew Ulufa’alu and Billy 
Hilly had prior to the April polls been enthusiasts for laws aimed at tying 
parliamentarians firmly to political parties. Had they been successful, they would have 
rendered illegal their own subsequent action. Under Sogavare, steps were taken to 
consolidate the position of cabinet. Most importantly, the number of cabinet ministers 
was increased from 20 to 24, close to half the 50-member parliament. Together with 
judicious usage of chairmanships of the state-owned corporations, such tactics were 
aimed at diminishing the potential for an opposition challenge. In other words, years of 
effort aimed at strengthening the role of parliament were potentially under threat. Instead, 
parliament would have reverted to being a mere talking shop or rubber-stamping device 
for government.  
 
Plans for the top-down construction of a party-based system are unlikely to be successful. 
Parties spontaneously arise where there are cleavages in the society that generate political 
polarization. In the Pacific Islands, for example, the only three territories that have fairly 
robust political parties are all polarised around key issues that divide both the electorate 
and the politicians. In Fiji, the schism between the indigenous Fijian and Indian migrant-
descended politicians has been the critical influence on the party divide. In New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia, the cleavage has been between those parties that want 
independence, and those that do not (or those that prefer some kind of loose autonomy 
from France). Elsewhere in the region, political parties tend chiefly to be loose factional 
alliances which assume significance only in the wake of general elections when the issue 
becomes who will form the government. Even in Samoa, Vanuatu, Marshall Islands and 
Kiribati, where political parties are sometimes thought more significant, organisations are 
more fluid than is commonly recognised (see Fraenkel 2006b). Samoa’s dominant 
Human Rights Protection Party may be unique in the Pacific because it has ruled, with 
only one brief exception, for a quarter of a century. Yet, in the wake of elections, Samoan 
MPs, like those elsewhere in the region, seek to gravitate towards the government 
benches, and political allegiances can be fluid. Vanuatu once had a robust party system 
focussed on the anglophone/ francophone cleavage during the days of Walter Lini’s 
Vanua’aku Pati and the opposition Union of Moderate parties, but after 1991 the major 
parties increasingly splintered and a more fractured political environment emerged (Van 
Trease 2005), although some micro-parties are still more organisationally robust in 
Vanuatu than other Melanesian countries. Where parties have arisen spontaneously 
because there are key issues that divide people, this no doubt adds to the coherence of 
parliamentary processes, but it also raises other difficulties, as the troubles of Fiji, New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia clearly show.    
 
Party Strengthening Laws in Solomon Islands 
 
In and of themselves, OLIPPAC-type policies will not promote a coherent party system 
in Solomon Islands. But they will strengthen the elite, and make more difficult the 
emergence of political newcomers, and perhaps contribute to frustrations about 
unaccountable leadership. The so-called political parties in Solomon Islands, at present, 
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are primarily vehicles for securing the top job for ambitious political big men, and their 
supporters. For example, straight after the 2006 polls, Chinese businessman Tommy 
Chan published a full page advert in the Solomon Star listing alleged members of the 
Association of Independent Members of Parliament (AIMP) in a bid to win support 
behind his favoured candidate, Snyder Rini18. Often the MPs listed in that advert had no 
idea that they were being cast as ‘members’ of AIMP, or the MP for this or that 
constituency was listed without the name (presumably because the writers did not know 
the electoral outcome in that constituency when they submitted the advert!). The example 
indicates something about what political parties (or, in this case, clusters of independent 
members) are in Solomon Islands. Similarly, former Prime Minister Bartholomew 
Ulufa’alu published adverts in the newspapers giving photos of the alleged candidates for 
his Liberal Party shortly before the 2006 polls, also hoping thereby to strengthen his 
claim to political leadership. In response, several candidates wrote angry letters to the 
newspapers denying any connections with the Liberal Party19.  In their quest for the 
Prime Ministerial position after general elections, the big men of Solomon Islands 
politics seek to project an image of significant support, hoping to generate a roller-coaster 
or bandwagon-type effect so that others quickly jump aboard, fearing exclusion from the 
impending process of distribution of ministerial portfolios. 
 
If the Solomon Islands introduces PNG-style legislation tying new members more firmly 
to these political big men, the result will be to make competition during the period 
between general elections and the prime ministerial vote even more intense than at 
present, and even more susceptible to money politics. Asian loggers and would-be 
casino-operators will be more likely to seek to influence this process. The stakes will be 
raised because lobbyists will know that, once the government is elected, it may be locked 
in for a full four year term. Competition between the camps habitually established at 
Honiara’s hotels will consequently be even more vigorous than usual, undermining the 
popular objective of seeking to avoid corruption surrounding the so-called ‘second 
election’. Only during this brief period will the bargaining power and opportunism of the 
new, first-time, MPs be greatly strengthened. Once the government is formed, the well-
established politicians who get ministerial portfolios will be better able to consolidate 
their control over parliament. The female politicians, of whom a growing number have 
been contesting elections of late, will be weakened, and alternative newer groupings will 
find themselves at a great disadvantage as compared to the established so-called parties. 
Eventually, the likely result will be a major political crisis, unless wise counsel prevails 
amongst judges who themselves ditch the new legislation.              
 
Other Approaches to Strengthening Governments in Solomon Islands 
 
Reforming Westminster systems to remove the possibility of ‘no confidence’ votes is the 
worst possible way to reform Solomon Islands institutions or strengthen government. The 
primary advantage of Westminster systems is that they generate greater potential for the 
mid-term removal of unpopular governments than presidential systems. In the 
presidential systems, it is usually difficult to remove the head of state and government, 
unless opponents go through long and elaborate methods of impeachment. As a result, 
Presidential systems – as in much of Latin America – have often been said to be more 
prone to coups than parliamentary systems20. On the other hand, the advantage of 
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Presidential systems is that they entail nationwide direct elections for the head of 
government, with the result that government has a strong and direct popular mandate. 
Retaining the parliamentary system - without the associated possibility of mid-term 
removal of governments - means adopting the weaker aspects of both systems. It misses 
out on the direct popular vote for the head of state, but adopts only the inflexibility of the 
locked-in form of government.   
 
However, a standard Presidential system would also be a poor choice for the Solomon 
Islands. Presidential systems tend to be highly majoritarian; there is a single presidential 
position to fill, and the most populous group (if it votes for a single candidate) will 
usually be able to capture the presidency. Another advantage of the parliamentary system 
in Solomon Islands is that governments have usually had to be coalitions with 
representatives from across the group, balancing in particular leaders from Malaita, 
Guadalcanal and the Western province.  
 
For the Solomon Islands, the better option would be to retain the Prime Ministerial 
system but introduce legislation that makes a successful ‘no confidence’ motion entail a 
general dissolution of parliament. Political scientists who are unfamiliar with Pacific 
politics may warn that this will entail too many snap elections and short-lived 
governments. However, another consequence of the weakness of parties in Melanesia is a 
extreme reluctance of politicians consider a premature dissolution. As we saw previously, 
PNG has never had a successful ‘no confidence’ motion during the last 12 months of a 
government, when doing so would entail a parliamentary dissolution. Kiribati has had 
three dissolutions, but has nevertheless been far more politically stable than its closest 
neighbours. Making a no confidence vote entail a dissolution of parliament is a far better 
option than forbidding no confidence votes for certain ‘grace periods’ or locking MPs 
into backing this or that political leader.  
 
However, neither option would, in itself, do anything to diminish political horse-trading 
between the general election and the Prime Ministerial election. There are four viable 
responses to address these issues. First, the Prime Ministerial election might be opened to 
public scrutiny, rather than taking place by secret ballot21. In 2006, election observers 
declined to observe the so-called ‘second election’ on the grounds that the constitution 
forbids them from doing so. Second, the period between the general election and the 
Prime Ministerial election could be shortened (the thirteen days separating the two in 
2006 compounded difficulties, and increased the scope for corruption). Third, politicians 
might be subjected to more rigorous scrutiny by formalizing the anti-corruption ‘pledges’ 
signed by candidates on the 2006 campaign trail. Nomination forms signed by intending 
candidates before a general election might require would-be MPs to declare themselves 
open to greater scrutiny than ordinary citizens by a strengthened Leadership Code 
Commission. Ultimately, however, tackling corruption during the run-up to a Prime 
Ministerial election is not something that will be achieved by new legislation. Laws 
against corruption already exist on the statute books. Curtailing these kind of activities 
would be greatly assisted by only one or two high profile convictions of would be-
lobbyists offering cash in the run up to a Prime Ministerial election.   
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 ‘If at anytime it appears to the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Speaker, 
that the leader of an independent group, by reason of the numerical strength of that independent group or by 
reason of the support which he receives from the members of independent groups generally, should be 
appointed as Leader of the Independent Members, the Governor-General shall appoint him as such leader’ 
[The Solomon Islands Independence Order 1978, S. 66, (2)].  To drop this provision seems sensible.  
3
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4
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2005.  
5
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 Sir Arnold Amet, former Chief Justice, Papua New Guinea, personal communication, Honiara, April 
2006. 
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 See Vohor Vs Attorney General [2004], Civil Appeal Case 24 of 2004, 8th December 2004. see also 
‘Vanuatu Agrees to Constitutional reform’, Vanuatu Daily Post, October 19, 2004; ‘Court to decide legality 
of 12-month Grace Period’, Vanuatu Daily Post, 5th December 2004; see also Jowitt, 2005, p462.  
8
 For details, see Gelu, 2005. 
9
 This issue arose also regarding the Fiji legislation, when the courts found it impossible to establish which 
of the two New Labour Unity Party MPs had ‘crossed the floor’ since there was no internal party resolution 
making clear the stance of the party (see Fraenkel, 2004. p128-9). 
10
 ‘The whole of the law and custom of parliament has its original from this one maxim, that whatever 
matter arises concerning either House of Parliament, ought to be examined, discussed, and adjudged in that 
House to which it relates, and not elsewhere’ (Blackstone, 1830, p163). With written constitutions, courts 
are sometimes more prone to regulate parliamentary conduct, but usually only where legal jurisdiction is 
clearly outlined in the Constitution. 
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12
 ‘The Maneaba ni Maungatabu [parliament] shall stand dissolved if, in respect of any matter before the 
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parties (i.e. nominal parties on the books of the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties) with the number 
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